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Abstract
In this paper a model based analysis of competition in the German wholesale elec-
tricity market is presented. Applying a multi-regional model which covers the inter-
regional transmission constraints between Germany and its neighboring countries,
potential for exercising market power by the four dominant electricity producers has
been found. Assuming Cournot behavior in the spot market, it has been analyzed to
what extent network investment can lead to enhanced competition. It has also been
shown that the impact of transmission reinforcement on market power differs among
interconnection lines due to the specific supply and demand structures within the
considered markets.
Key words: Competition analysis, Market power, Cournot model, Transmission
network investment, Interregional electricity exchange.
1 Introduction
As a consequence of the high market concentration due to mergers and acquisi-
tions among generators, the German electricity market faces growing potential
for market power. Over the last few years the four generating companies RWE
Power AG, E.ON Energie AG, Vattenfall Europe AG and EnBW AG formed
an oligopoly with RWE and E.ON having a dominant market position. Taking
the acquisitions within Eastern Europe and Great Britain into consideration,
there are no indicators that a change in the two firms’ dominance could be
expected.
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Considering concentration measures like the CRn concentration ratio or the
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), Germany’s electricity market can be re-
garded as highly concentrated. Given installed generation capacity, the CR3
approximately amounts to 69 %, whereas the CR5 reaches about 80 %. The
HHI value yields approximately 1945. Even if traditional concentration mea-
sures can be inappropriate instruments to analyze competition (cf. e. g. Boren-
stein et al. (1999) and Borenstein and Shepard (2002)), at least they can
indicate if market power problems probably might occur. Additionally, us-
ing ex post comparison of electricity prices and predicted competitive system
marginal costs, the actual degree of market power can be quantified, but it
has limited ability to derive conclusions with regard to changes in market
structure and strategic behavior. For an analysis of the Californian electric-
ity market cf. Borenstein et al. (2000b) and Muesgens (2004) for a similar
approach regarding Germany.
Given the specific conditions in electricity markets, e.g. low elasticity of de-
mand, non-storability, capacity constraints in generation and transmission and
several alternatives for market behavior, model based analyses which take non-
competitive market transaction into account explicitly, can therefore be more
suitable to diagnose market power (cf. e. g. Smeers (1997) and Borenstein and
Bushnell (1999)). Furthermore, structural aspects that influence companies’
potential to exercise market power like actual interconnector capacities should
be addressed within the model analyses.
However, several electricity market models of strategic interaction, which take
interregional transmission constraints into account have already been devel-
oped, cf. e. g. Amundsen et al. (1998), Day et al. (2002), Borenstein et al.
(2000a) and Metzler et al. (2003). Moreover, Chuang et al. (2001) and Mur-
phy and Smeers (2002) introduce network investment in dynamic models of
strategic behavior. For a recent overview, cf. Neuhoff et al. (2005) and the
references therein. Most of the existing game theoretic models for analyzing
market power, applying either a Cournot or a supply-functions approach. As
Cournot models are usually easier to solve, especially when technical con-
straints regarding generation and transmission are considered, this type of
game has often been modeled. Furthermore, as the Cournot-Nash solution
is representing an upper bound for possible supply-functions equilibria, the
calculated market outcome can be interpreted as a maximum impact of non-
cooperative behavior, cf. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and the restrictions
described therein and Borenstein et al. (1999).
Regarding Germany’s current electricity market structure, potential for ex-
ercising market power of the four dominant producers are supposed. Taking
interregional electricity exchange into account, a multi-regional Cournot model
has therefore been developed to analyze the impact of network reinforcement
on competition in the German electricity market.
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 two important aspects affect-
ing the German wholesale market are described, i. e. interregional exchange
and spot and derivatives markets. The mathematical formulation of the devel-
oped model is described in Section 3. In section 4 exemplary results regarding
changes in cross-border capacities within Europe are presented. Finally, con-
clusions are drawn in section 5.
2 Changes in the German electricity market
Germany is highly integrated within the European electricity market, having
various interconnections with its neighboring countries. Until the market was
liberalized in 1998, it was characterized by vertically integrated utilities, sup-
plying residential and industrial consumers. With the opening of Germany’s
electricity market, several changes regarding structural and operational as-
pects can be observed.
2.1 Interregional electricity exchange
Regarding the central location of Germany, interregional electricity exchange
has been continuously increased over the last years. Sharing borders with
France, Luxembourg, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Poland,
Czech Republic, Austria and Switzerland, Germany’s gross electricity ex-
change has grown from approximately 72 TWh in 1995 to approximately
100 TWh in 2003 and 96 TWh in 2004, respectively (cf. UCTE (2005)).
Given the differences in region-specific generation and demand structures, elec-
tricity exchange varies between countries and over time. Figure 1 presents bi-
lateral electricity exchange between Germany and its neighboring countries in
2004. It can be seen that Germany is a net importer with regard to France
of between approximately 3.9 TWh in winter and 5.9 TWh in summer as
well as the Czech Republic of 4.2 TWh in summer and 4.4 TWh in inter-
mediate time, whereas it is a net exporter regarding the BeNeLux region of
between approximately 4.9 TWh in summer and 8.7 TWh in winter. Concern-
ing Poland, Austria and Switzerland, Germany is also a net exporter. The
electricity exchange between Germany and Sweden and Germany and Den-
mark, respectively, is nearly balanced.
As interregional transmission in Europe was previously mainly coordinated
to balance variations in demand and supply on the inter-country level, it has
recently become more important regarding trading aspects. Due to legally un-
restricted international electricity trade possibilities, cross-border exchange is
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Fig. 1. Bilateral electricity exchange between Germany and its neighboring countries
in summer, winter and intermediate time, 2004 – Export(+), Import(-)
projected to serve common economic purposes, particularly to reduce interre-
gional price differences. However, beside the legal framework, technical aspects
concerning transmission and production have to be taken into account when
market structure and regionally varying electricity prices in Europe are to be
analyzed.
Considering the bilateral electricity exchange quantities, several transmission
lines within the internal European market show occasional congestion. Beside
e. g. Haubrich et al. (2001), who have analyzed transmission congestion in the
former EU-15 countries including Switzerland and Norway, KEMA Consulting
(2005) has focused on the European asseccion countries. The studies highlight
that electricity trade is temporally affected by both cross-border and domestic
network capacity bottlenecks.
2.2 Spot and derivatives market
The European Energy Exchange AG (EEX) in Leipzig is operating a day-
ahead spot market for physical contracts since 2000. Within a double-sided
call auction, market participants submit bits for the quantity they want to
purchase and sell the following day. Single hour contracts of 0.1 MW delivery
capacity and block contracts for multiple hours of 1 MW delivery capacity
can be traded each day until noon. After collecting all bits in a closed order
book, EEX aggregates individual supply and demand curves to determine a
uniform market clearing price. Physical delivery can be executed in each of
the five transmission system operator (TSO) zones. In absence of transmission
congestion, the spot market price is the same for all of Germany. Given the
possible trading options at the established spot market, the market clearing
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price can therefore be regarded as a reference for other market segments.
Considering the amount of electricity traded at the EEX, it can be observed
that spot market quantity has continuously increased since 2000. While quan-
tity amounts to approximately 14 TWh in 2001, the traded quantity is about
25 TWh in 2002 and 48 TWh in 2003. In the year 2004 a total of approxi-
mately 59 TWh was contracted through the physical spot market in Germany.
Regarding total electricity consumption, the traded spot market volume was
about 11 % in 2004.
Beside the day-ahead market, the EEX also established a derivatives mar-
ket in 2001. As spot market contracts call for physical delivery of electricity
the next day, derivative contracts usually are fulfilled financially. After finan-
cial settlement, the contracted quantity can be obtained at the spot market.
More general, derivatives enclose both futures contracts with financial settle-
ment only and forward contracts which call for delivery or purchase of the
committed electricity quantity. At the EEX base load and peak load futures
and forwards can be traded, respectively. Among other things, the contracts
are standardized concerning the delivery period, i. e. monthly, quarterly and
yearly, the load profile, the place of delivery, the contract volume, which is
1 MW for each hour committed, and the tradeable period for this contract.
3 The model
For analyzing competition in the German electricity market, a multi-regional
Cournot model has been developed. The German electricity market is consid-
ered to be a 4 player oligopoly facing a competitive fringe and being physically
interconnected to its European neighboring countries. Figure 2 depicts regions
and transmission lines covered by the model. Electricity markets within the
German neighboring regions are assumed to be fully competitive. Transmis-
sion capacities are supplied by a single transmission system operator and are
based on average Net Transfer Capacities (NTC) for the years 2002 to 2004
provided by the European Electricity System Operators (ETSO) (cf. Table 1).
Power plant portfolios for RWE Power AG, E.ON Energie AG, Vattenfall Eu-
rope AG, EnBW AG and the competitive fringe are modeled on a unit basis,
whereas portfolios for the neighboring countries are represented on a higher
aggregation level. Electricity demand is separated in peak and off-peak load
distinguishing summer, winter and intermediate periods. The electricity sup-
pliers solve a constrained optimization problem. Thereby producers maximize
their profits in the spot market, taking generation and transmission constraints
into account. For the analysis presented in this paper, the model is applied,
varying interregional transmission capacities exogenously.
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Fig. 2. Regions and transmission lines covered by model
Table 1
Interregional transmission capacities among countries [MW]
DE FR BE/LU NL DK SW PL CZ AT CH
DE ∞ 3120 760 2940 1750 460 1242 1512 1460 3630
FR 3120 ∞ 1150 - - - - - - 590
BE/LU 760 1150 ∞ 1030 - - - - - -
NL 2940 - 1030 ∞ - - - - - -
DK 1750 - - - ∞ 924 - - - -
SW 460 - - - 924 ∞ 240 - - -
PL 1242 - - - - 240 ∞ 658 - -
CZ 1512 - - - - - 658 ∞ 234 -
AT 1460 - - - - - - 234 ∞ 370
CH 3630 590 - - - - - - 370 ∞
3.1 Demand side
Time varying electricity demand in each country is represented by approxi-
mated load duration curves. To capture different load situations in a year, the
load duration curves are decomposed into two load (peak, off-peak) and three
time segments (summer, winter, intermediate). For Germany, load varies from
40275 MW in the summer off-peak load segment to 68331 MW in the winter
peak load segment. Peak load contains demand values for weekdays from 08:00
a.m. to 08:00 p.m. whereas the off-peak load segment contains the weekends
and the hours from 08:00 p.m. to 08:00 a.m. on weekdays. Hence, peak load
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covers 960 hours and off-peak load 1960 hours each time segment. Demand
values are based on data for the year 2000 provided by the Union for Co-
ordination of Transmission for Electricity (UCTE), cf. UCTE (2000). They
have been adjusted concerning the growth in electricity demand until 2005.
Figure 3 presents the exemplary decomposition of the load duration curve for
Germany.
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Fig. 3. Approximation of load duration curve for Germany, 2000
Demand curves for each region, load and time segment in the spot market, are
modeled applying an inverse constant elasticity demand function. Equilibrium
electricity price Pt,s,r(St,s,r) : R
+ 7→ R+ is a function of the form:
Pt,s,r(St,s,r) = P
ref
t,s,r
(
Pt,s,r(St,s,r)
Sreft,s,r
) 1
ǫ
(1)
with St,s,r being total supply in each demand segment t and s and each coun-
try r. The demand curves are calibrated by using reference prices for each
demand segment and each country. Reference prices for e. g. Germany were
calculated from European Energy Exchange AG data for the year 2002. Ac-
cording to the demand segment specification, average system marginal prices
are 13.31 e/MWh for the summer off-peak and 34.98 e/MWh for the interme-
diate peak load segment, respectively. Price elasticity of demand ǫ is assumed
to be −0.25 within the different load segments. Figure 4 depicts exemplary
inverse demand curves for different load situations in Germany.
3.2 Supply side
On the supply side, real technical and economical data for specification of
the different types of fossil fired power plants and non-fossil power plants are
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Fig. 4. Inverse demand curves for different time segments in Germany
taken. The overall production capacities are assumed to be given. Specific op-
eration cost for each type of unit are calculated on the basis of fuel prices,
additional operation and maintenance cost and electrical efficiencies. Power
plant efficiencies are determined analytically considering fuel type and date of
unit commissioning. Due to the unit based representation of the German pro-
ducers’ power plant portfolios, this approach leads to 82 different variable cost
categories. Regarding the generation structures within Germany’s neighboring
countries, power plant portfolios are represented on a higher aggregation level
applying 18 different variable cost categories. However, the technologically ori-
ented representation of production capacities facilitates a relatively realistic
approximation of the generation structure within the several countries.
The differentiated electricity generation portfolios of the four German supply-
ing companies on the one hand and the more aggregated generation portfolios
for the nine neighboring countries on the other hand, included in the model,
represent almost 95 % of the installed generation capacity in each country.
Ordering the different production units regarding their variable production
costs, a country-specific merit order curve can be constructed. Figure 5 de-
picts the merit order curve for Germany based on the installed capacities for
2005.
For analyzing the potential to exercise market power in the German electricity
market, the given market structure has to be taken into account. Therefore,
the overall installed generation capacity has to be allocated among strategic
players. According to the analysis of the given horizontal capital ownerships
among utilities, the strategically controlled production capacities can be de-
rived. Due to focusing on the German market and assuming that electricity
markets in the neighboring countries are fully competitive, only the major
German generation companies are represented in detail. Furthermore, capital
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Fig. 5. Merit order curve for Germany, 2005
ownership across borders has been neglected, thus German suppliers utilize
domestic capacities only. Table 5 at the end of this paper gives an overview
of the individual generation capacities owned by the four strategic players
and the competitive fringe in Germany and the aggregated capacities of the
neighboring countries.
To derive individual merit order curves, or marginal cost curves, for each
strategic player and fringe supply, respectively, installed generation capacity
has been adjusted to given technical and seasonal availability. Average planned
unit outage for conventional power plants and time varying water inflow for run
of river and lake power plants has been taken into account to distinguish time
depending availability. Furthermore, pumped storage capacities are assumed
to be available in the peak load segment only. This assumption has been made
due to the static structure of the model. As power plants are not dispatched
dynamically, pumped storage capacities are assumed to pump in off-peak pe-
riods. Moreover, pump losses φt,s−,r, with s
− ∈ {off − peak} are derived from
historical data and have been considered. Hence, merit order curves for peak
and off-peak load differ considerably for particular players and countries, re-
spectively. As a result, each company is represented by six different marginal
cost curves. Similarly, six varying marginal cost curves within each German
neighboring country have been derived. Figures 6 and 7 present the marginal
cost curves for E.ON Energie AG and Vattenfall Europe AG, respectively,
which are based on average available generation capacities.
As the model is formulated in Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) for-
mat, here the stepwise marginal cost functions are approximated by strictly
increasing polynomials. Marginal cost functions Ci,t,s(xi,t,s) : R 7→ R
+ are of
the form:
Ci,t,s(xi,t,s) = c1x
4
i,t,s + c2x
3
i,t,s + c3x
2
i,t,s + c4xi,t,s + c5 (2)
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Fig. 6. Marginal cost curves and approximation for E.ON Energie AG
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Fig. 7. Marginal cost curves and approximation for Vattenfall Europe AG
where c1 to c4 ∈] −∞,∞[ and c5 ∈ [0,∞[ are estimated by a least squares
method algorithm. Generation by firm i ∈ I in time segment t and load
segment s, xi,t,s ∈ [0, x
max
i,t,s ] is constrained by firm’s availably capacity x
max
i,t,s .
Following the assumption that cross-border ownership is neglected, the firms’
electricity production takes place in the country they are located.
3.3 Producers optimization program
Producers maximize their profits in the physical spot market, deciding about
the optimal generation program. Spot market behavior of the four strategic
players is assumed to be of Cournot type. Fringe suppliers in Germany and
generators in neighboring countries are assumed to behave as price takers.
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Given the limited production and transmission capacities and taking fringe
supply and interregional electricity trade into account, generators face a con-
strained one-stage optimization problem.
Each oligopolistic supplier i ∈ I maximizes its profit Πi,t,s,r(si,t,s,r) : R
n 7→ R
by determining the optimal electricity output si,t,s,r. With suppressing indices
for demand segments t (time), s (load) and r (country), profit for each player
can be written as:
max
si
Πi(si) = P (S)si − TCi(si) ∀ i, t, s, r (3)
with S =
∑
i∈I si being aggregated supply by all generators. TCi(si) based on
TCi(xi) : R 7→ R
+ represents total generation cost for supply of player i in the
spot market, being the antiderivative of the estimated marginal cost function
in Eq. (2).
TCi(xi) =
1
5
c1x
5
i +
1
4
c2x
4
i +
1
3
c3x
3
i +
1
2
c4x
2
i + c5xi + FCi ∀ i, t, s (4)
Thereby variable production costs are captured by the first five terms, whereas
FCi denotes fixed cost of electricity generation. Regarding the short model
horizon, generation capacities are assumed to be given. Power plant investment
and hence fixed cost can therefore be ignored for the optimization.
Firms’ electricity generation xi has to be:
xi ≥
∑
r
si,r ∀ i, t, s (5)
and is constrained by its maximum available production capacity. The pro-
duction constraint gi(xi) : R 7→ R has to be satisfied for each firm i in each
demand segment
gi(xi) : xi − x
max
i ≤ 0 ∀ i, t, s (6)
As interregional electricity trade is allowed, producers decide not only about
the quantity they want to sell in their country r, but also about the amount
they want to sell in foreign countries rr, i. e. export. Exports are denoted by
srri,t,s,r, with the superscript indicating the country of destination. The TSO
supply transmission services at marginal cost of congestion. Therefore, the
producers in country r have to take interregional transmission capacity con-
straints and possible congestion charges into account. The transmission con-
straint er,rr(S
rr
r , S
r
rr) : R
n 7→ R for each line r → rr of distinct countries that
has to be satisfied, is:
er,rr(S
rr
r , S
r
rr) :

∑
i−
srri,r +
∑
i+
sri,rr

− tmaxr→rr ≤ 0 ∀ t, s (7)
with i− denoting suppliers located in country r and i+ denoting suppliers
located in country rr. Again, following the assumption that electricity markets
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in the neighboring countries are fully competitive, imports to Germany are
priced at marginal production costs. Each interregional transmission line has
a maximum capacity of tmaxr→rr, whereas inner-country transmission is assumed
to be unconstrained. In addition, transport losses between district countries
has being neglected. Total electricity supply per demand segment in a country
r can therefore be written as:
Sr =
∑
i−
sri,r +
∑
i+
sri,rr ∀ t, s, r (8)
For Germany (rDE), domestic electricity supply can also be described in more
detail by distinguishing oligopoly supply on the one side and competitive fringe
supply on the other side:
SrDE =
∑
i
sr
DE
i,rDE + s
rDE
fringe,rDE ∀ t, s (9)
Considering production/supply and demand balance in each demand segment
and each country, production has to be adjusted regarding network and pump
losses. Contrary to the neglected additional transmission losses due to interre-
gional trade, network losses within a country θt,s,r have been captured in the
model. With pump losses φt,s−,r, Eq. (5) has to be extended to:
xi ≥
∑
r
si,r(1 + θr + φr) ∀ i, t, s (10)
which equals overall electricity demand in each segment and each country. Es-
timated network losses are based on historical data, similarly to the estimation
of pump losses for the off-peak periods.
However, when producers maximize their profit on the spot market by opti-
mizing their output, they have to take the constraints gi(xi) and er,rr(S
rr
r , S
r
rr)
into account. The resulting nonlinear program with inequality constraints can
be formulated in mixed complementarity format. For maximizing the profit
function (cf. Eq. (3)) for each player simultaneously, the first order Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker conditions have been derived. In equilibrium, none of the players
and generators, respectively, are willing to change its production program. Due
to the form of the approximated marginal cost and demand functions, the re-
sulting Cournot-Nash equilibrium represents an unique solution to the given
problem.
Introducing a function Li,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, λi,t,s, τr→rr) : R
n 7→ Rn similar to a La-
grangian, the first order conditions of the nonlinear program that have to be
satisfied are:
∂Li,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, λi,t,s, τr→rr)
∂si,t,s,r
=
∂Pt,s,r(St,s,r)
∂St,s,r
∂St,s,r
∂si,t,s,r
si,t,s,r + Pt,s,r(St,s,r)
12
−
∂TC(si,t,s,r)
∂si,t,s,r
−λi,t,s −
∑
r→rr
τr→rr ≤ 0 ∀i, t, s, r (11)
complements
si,t,s,r ≥ 0 ∀ i, t, s, r (12)
and the inner product
∂Li,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, λi,t,s, τr→rr)
∂si,t,s,r
si,t,s,r = 0 ∀ i, t, s, r (13)
Partial derivative, taking into account the given production constraint for a
generator is:
∂Li,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, λi,t,s, τr→rr)
∂λi,t,s
= si,t,s,r − s
max
i,t,s,r ≤ 0 ∀ i, t, s (14)
complements
λi,t,s ≥ 0 ∀ i, t, s (15)
and the inner product
∂Li,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, λi,t,s, τr→rr)
∂λi,t,s
λi,t,s = 0 ∀ i, t, s (16)
It should be noted that, concerning definition in Eq. (6), the generation ca-
pacity constraint gi(xi) is related to xi,t,s. As xi,t,s and si,t,s,r are linked by the
production/supply balance (cf. Eqs. (5) and (10), respectively), the supply
variable si,t,s,r is applied in Eq. (14) and (16), due to consistency in mathemat-
ical notation. Partial derivatives, taking into account the given transmission
constraint, result in:
∂Li,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, λi,t,s, τr→rr)
∂τr→rr
=

∑
i−
srri,r +
∑
i+
sri,rr

− tmaxr→rr ≤ 0 ∀ r → rr
(17)
complements
τr→rr ≥ 0 ∀ r → rr (18)
and the inner product
∂Li,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, λi,t,s, τr→rr)
∂τr→rr
τr→rr = 0 ∀ r → rr (19)
Considering the constraints of given production and transmission capacities,
Eqs. (14) and (17) are associated with the variables λi,t,s and τr→rr, respec-
tively. λi,t,s denotes the shadow variable or shadow price of the production
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constraint, whereas τr→rr denotes the the shadow variable or shadow price of
congestion of a transmission line between distinct countries. Due to the as-
sumption that the TSO supplies transmission services at marginal congestion
cost, τr→rr can be interpreted as a congestion fee, generators have to take
into account when maximizing spot market profit. Therefore, interregional
trade decisions are determined by interregional price differences and marginal
transmission cost.
Following the Cournot assumption that competitors are supposed to not re-
act to player i’s output decision, i. e. the conjectural variation is zero, the
term ∂S/∂si in Eq. (11) can be ignored. This assumption also holds for the
competitive fringe and the foreign generators concerning oligopolistic supply.
Dominant producers’ influence on market price due to strategic behavior can
be well shown by rearranging the first order condition in Eq. (11) (indices
suppressed). Applying market share ϑi and price elasticity of demand ǫ, player
i’s constrained profit maximization condition is:
P (S)
(
1 +
ϑi
ǫ
)
= Ci(si) + λi +
∑
r→rr
τr→rr ∀ i, t, s, r (20)
where Ci(si) denotes marginal cost of generation si (cf. Eq. (2)) and λi and
τr→rr indicate the shadow variables of the given production and transmission
constraints, respectively.
The mark-up is thereby determined by the oligopolist’s market share ϑi and
the price elasticity of demand ǫ. As producers’ strategically controlled gener-
ation capacity and related variable cost structures differ significantly among
players, market shares and hence achievable price mark-ups are supposed to
be asymmetric in equilibrium.
Due to the possibilities for interregional electricity trade, domestic market out-
come can not be regarded as independent from neighboring countries’ market
structures. Regarding the differences in electricity generation portfolios and
demand schedules, electricity trade can therefore provide significant profits
from arbitrating price differences. Moreover, transmission network reinforce-
ment is likely appropriate to improve price adjustment among countries.
4 Exemplary model results
The model described above has been applied to analyze competition in the
German electricity market. Given the current market structure, German elec-
tricity suppliers form a four player oligopoly with a competitive fringe. To what
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extent the four dominante oligopolistic producers RWE Power AG, E.ON En-
ergie AG, Vattenfall Europe AG and EnBW AG can exercise market power
depends on various factors. Beside the type of market behavior, absolut fringe
supply possibilities and the assumptions made regarding anticipation towards
fringe reaction, the potentials for exercising market power depend highly on
the possibilities to limit price increase by electricity imports. In the following
subsections, exemplary model results considering electricity transmission are
presented.
4.1 Base case
Assuming firstly that the liberalized German electricity market is not inte-
grated in the European UCTE network, a one-stage Cournot-Nash equilibrium
in quantities for the physical spot market can be calculated. Given this restric-
tive assumption, the derived market equilibrium represents the potentials for
exercising market power by the four oligopolistic suppliers as an upper bound
for possible market manipulation. Figure 8 presents resulting market prices in
the defined demand segments. The price elasticity of demand ǫ is assumed to
be −0.25.
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Fig. 8. Electricity prices in Germany – no transmission allowed, Scenario:
Cournot (BC)
Considering the potentials to increase wholesale market prices by withhold-
ing capacity, i. e. reducing supply, the German electricity market seems not
to be perfectly competitive. Under the given assumptions, dominant produc-
ers are able to increase prices between factors of approximately 2.0 (summer
off-peak period) and 2.6 (winter peak period), compared to a calculated per-
fectly competitive equilibrium. Electricity price e. g. in the summer off-peak
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segment increases therefore from 15.84 e/MWh in the perfectly competitive
case to 31.27 e/MWh under Cournot behavior. In the winter peak segment
prices change from 28.40 e/MWh (competitive) to 74.74 e/MWh (Cournot),
cf. Figure 8. The observable price increases result from significant mark-ups,
which can be realized by the oligopolistic producers. Table 2 presents minimum
and maximum values of the Lerner-Index which is defined as:
LIi =
ϑi
ǫ
≡
P (S)− Ci(xi)
P (S)
∀ i, t, s (21)
and overall profit under different assumptions regarding producers’ behavior
in the base case.
Table 2
Lerner-Index (LI) and profit [mill.e] of German producers – no transmission allowed
RWE E.ON Vattenfall EnBW Fringe
LI min/max 0.69/0.82 0.66/0.80 0.65/0.72 0.53/0.59 0.00/0.25
Cournot (BC) 3421 3272 2847 2265 3784
Prof.
Compet. (BC) 1635 1324 802 588 483
It can be seen that the competitive fringe profits substantially from strate-
gic behavior of the four dominant producers in Germany. As the competitive
fringe behaves as a price taker, its generation is increased significantly due to
higher electricity prices. Moreover, within the peak load segments, the Lerner-
Index of fringe supply results in values greater than zero, indicating a situation
in which prices exceed marginal cost. This can be explained with limitations
in their generation capacity. Even if electricity prices are above marginal gen-
eration cost, fringe suppliers are not able to extend their production further.
Regarding overall efficiency of electricity generation, it can be shown that
strategic behavior leads to unbalanced marginal cost among generators and
therefore to a suboptimal allocation of production factors. The observable shift
in generation from RWE, E.ON, Vattenfall and EnBW to fringe producers
increases dead weight losses additionally. Considering the existing power plant
portfolios, it is evident that relatively high priced gas and oil units are utilized
by the competitive fringe in equilibrium.
4.2 Interregional transmission and network investment
Given the actual situation, where Germany is integrated into a large European
electricity network having various interconnection to its neighboring countries,
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the restrictive assumptions in the base case have to be relaxed. Moreover, with
reinforcing the internal European electricity market, the European Union aims
to strengthen competition among generators and to improve overall efficiency.
Regarding the interregional transmission possibilities, competition analyses
have to take into account the potentials to limit price increases due to exercised
market power by electricity imports.
Allowing for interregional electricity exchange, i. e. extending the options to
optimize spot market decisions for the German players and the generators in
foreign countries by modeling existing transmission lines (cf. Table 1), leads
to significant changes in results. Regarding the exchange possibilities, foreign
generators can profit from market power induced price increases in Germany
by exporting electricity to the German market. Thereby foreign electricity
exports keep pressure on prices in Germany, preventing for mark-ups observ-
able in the base case scenario. Figure 9 presents a price comparison for the
Cournot-Nash equilibria in the base case (Cournot (BC)), in the case where
interregional electricity exchange is allowed (Cournot (TR)), and the corre-
sponding perfectly competitive equilibrium with transmission (Competitive
(TR)).
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Fig. 9. Electricity prices in Germany – transmission allowed, Scenario: Cournot (TR)
As can be seen, interregional electricity exchange forces down prices in the
Cournot (TR) scenario by approximately 32 % for the summer off-peak pe-
riod and 40 % for the winter peak period, compared to the Cournot (BC)
equilibrium in the base case. Nevertheless with these price decreases, the large
German players are able to raise market prices by factors of between approx-
imately 1.3 (summer off-peak) and 1.6 (winter peak) over the competitive
equilibrium. According to the observable price changes, values for the Lerner-
Index and the overall profit decrease also, cf. Table 3. It can be noted that
in equilibrium the profits decrease, assuming both Cournot and competitive
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behavior, except a slight increase in profit of RWE Power AG in the competi-
tive case. Due to interregional trade, this effect can be lead back to profitable
exports to neighboring countries and domestic price changes, which can possi-
bly cause positive effects on profit. However, a detailed presentation of results
regarding exchange values and regional specific numbers is omitted here.
Table 3
Lerner-Index (LI) and profit [mill.e] of German producers – transmission allowed
RWE E.ON Vattenfall EnBW Fringe
LI min/max 0.48/0.65 0.44/0.61 0.43/0.52 0.36/0.43 0.00/0.00
Cournot (TR) 2027 1824 1390 1082 1390
Prof.
Compet. (TR) 1651 1261 753 554 420
Considering the current structure of the European transmission grid, e. g.
Haubrich et al. (2001) and KEMA Consulting (2005) analyzed the cross-border
capacities to identify critical bottlenecks within the internal European mar-
ket. As was seen in comparison of base case results with the scenario where
interregional exchange is allowed, congestion in transmission lines can nega-
tively influence regional price adjustment and therefore be a crucial factor to
prevent market power mitigation. Taking into account transmission reinforce-
ment projects that have been already identified by the European Commission
within the Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E) priority projects, sev-
eral bottlenecks can be identified for German cross-border trade.
Following Haubrich et al. (2001) and KEMA Consulting (2005), the North-
Western European interconnections among Belgium/Germany and The Nether-
lands as well as Denmark and Germany can be regarded as highly congested
all over the year. Additionally, the cross-border link between France and Ger-
many shows occasional congestion, particularly in summer. For Germany’s
interconnections to Eastern Europe, the transmission lines to Poland are con-
sidered to be congested also. Beside the already mentioned interconnections
within the BeNeLux region, transmission lines between Belgium and France
and for South-Eastern Europe, Austria and Czech Republic have been identi-
fied as critical bottlenecks, which may have an impact on market outcome in
Germany. Thus, applying the model for analyzing the competition enhancing
effects of transmission capacity expansion between Germany and its neighbor-
ing countries, the following reinforcement projects are considered.
• Germany ⇐⇒ The Netherlands, 700 MW
• Germany ⇐⇒ France, 600 MW
• Germany ⇐⇒ Denmark, 1250 MW
• Germany ⇐⇒ Poland, 750 MW
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• Belgium ⇐⇒ The Netherlands, 1000 MW
• Belgium ⇐⇒ France, 1000 MW
• Austria ⇐⇒ Czech Republic, 250 MW
Increasing the congested German cross-border transmission capacities leads
to increased pressure on the dominant firms to lower mark-ups and hence
to a decrease in market price. As possibilities to export electricity into the
German market grow, potentials for exercising market power decline. The
competition enhancing effect of interregional electricity exchange has already
been observed by comparing the base case results with the situation where
interregional transmission is considered. The resulting effects on prices due to
the specified grid enlargement are presented in Figure 10. The Cournot-Nash
equilibrium with capacity expansion is denoted by Cournot (TR+), whereas
Competitive (TR+) represents the corresponding perfectly competitive equi-
librium. It can be seen that the strategically influenced electricity price is
reduced by approximately 6 % in the summer off-peak period, whereas the
price reduction in the winter and intermediate peak periods amounts to 12 %
and 13 %, respectively, compared to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium considering
the current transmission capacities (Cournot (TR)).
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Fig. 10. Electricity prices in Germany – transmission network investment, Scenario:
Cournot (TR+)
Although network reinforcement lowers the strategically influenced electricity
prices in Germany, the oligopolistic players are still able to exercise market
power and to increase prices significantly. Given the perfectly competitive
market outcome (Competitive (TR+)), the electricity price in the summer,
winter and intermediate peak periods of the Cournot (TR+) scenario lies
39 %, 47 % and 44 % above the competitive level. For the corresponding
off-peak periods, price increases of 22 %, 30 % and 24 % can be observed.
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Again, the potentials to increase market price by withholding capacities and
supply, respectively, can also be analyzed by calculating the Lerner-Index, cf.
Table 4. As expected, Lerner-Index and profit is reduced, due to enhanced
imported competition by foreign electricity supply in the German market.
Table 4
Lerner-Index (LI) and profit [mill.e] of German producers – transmission network
investment
RWE E.ON Vattenfall EnBW Fringe
LI min/max 0.44/0.59 0.41/0.55 0.39/0.46 0.32/0.37 0.00/0.00
Cournot (TR+) 1772 1570 1170 899 1042
Prof.
Compet. (TR+) 1577 1221 737 544 401
In summary, the results indicate that reinforcement of the above considered
transmission lines within the internal European electricity market mitigates
the potentials to exercise market power in Germany. Hence, the reduction of
network congestion is therefore suitable to enhance competition and therefore
to lower possible strategically influenced electricity prices in Germany, given
its oligopolistic market structure.
4.3 Gradual network reinforcement
As has been shown, increased possibilities for interregional electricity exchange
due to the above described transmission investment projects can lead to en-
hanced competition in Germany. To what extent gradual network investments
between Germany and its neighboring countries can change market power po-
tential has furthermore been analyzed considering exemplary bilateral cross-
border transmission capacity enlargements.
Within the scenario Cournot (TR++), the transmission lines between Ger-
many and France, The Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland have been sep-
arately increased in 20 steps each of 100 MW, i. e. about 2000 MW overall (cf.
Table 1 for initial capacity values). It can be observed that the enlargements of
different transmission lines have specific effects on German electricity prices.
Figures 11 and 12 present the price development in the summer and winter
peak period, respectively, due to stepwise network investments. Whereas the
increase of the cross-border capacity between German and Denmark leads to
a decrease in electricity price by approximately 5.0 % in the summer peak
segment, the price decrease due to network investment between Germany and
The Netherlands amounts to approximately 4.2 %.
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Fig. 11. Electricity prices in the summer peak period in Germany – gradual trans-
mission network investment, Scenario: Cournot (TR++)
Regarding the interconnection capacity to Switzerland, the German electricity
price keeps constant from a bilateral transmission capacity of 5430 MW on-
ward. The same effect can be seen in the winter peak period. At a transmission
capacity of 4530 MW, additional network enlargement to Switzerland does not
lead to a further price decrease in Germany. Electricity price keeps constant
on a level of 44.21 e/MWh (cf. Figure 12). This effect is determined by the
specific supply and demand structures in the Swiss market. As marginal gener-
ation cost and hence electricity price in the winter peak period in Switzerland
amounts to the German market price level, no additional electricity exchange
is induced.
Similar to the price changes in the summer peak period, network investments
in the cross-border capacity to Denmark lead to a greater price decrease in
the winter peak segment in Germany than investments in the interconnection
capacity to The Netherlands (cf. Figure 12). Whereas Germany/Denmark net-
work investments amount to approximately 4.2 % price reduction, investments
in the cross-border capacity to The Netherlands lead to approximately 3.7 %
price decrease.
The increased possibilities for electricity exchange between Germany and its
neighboring countries lead to higher pressure on electricity prices and hence
to decreasing potential to exercise market power. Due to further growing ex-
port possibilities of foreign countries, German producers’ ability to influence
the market price is reduced. Figure 13 presents the Lerner-Index for the two
dominant generators RWE Power AG and E.ON Energie AG in the winter
peak period in Germany. It can be observed that the changes in the Lerner-
Index show similar developments as the electricity price changes presented in
Figure 12.
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Fig. 12. Electricity prices in the winter peak period in Germany – gradual trans-
mission network investment, Scenario: Cournot (TR++)
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Fig. 13. Lerner-Index of RWE Power AG and E.ON Energie AG in the winter peak
period – gradual transmission network investment, Scenario: Cournot (TR++)
Besides the potential to mitigate market power and therefore to enhance com-
petition, the analysis has shown that the impact of transmission network
investments on market outcome are determined by the specific supply and
demand structures in the considered electricity markets. Given the different
possible effects on market prices, the specific outcomes of various investments
have to be taken into account when suitable bilateral interconnection rein-
forcement is to be implemented.
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5 Conclusions
The model based analysis of competition in the German electricity market has
shown that there are potentials to exercise market power by the four domi-
nant producers RWE Power AG, E.ON Energie AG, Vattenfall Europe AG
and EnBW AG. It has also been discussed how network reinforcement influ-
ences producers’ market decisions and to what extent transmission investments
contribute to market power mitigation in Germany.
Depending on the regarded investment projects, German market outcomes are
determined by specific supply and demand structures within the considered
countries. It has been shown that network investments in the cross-border
capacity between Germany and Denmark lead to a stronger price reduction
than e. g. investments in the interconnection capacity between Germany and
The Netherlands, given strategic behavior of the German electricity producers.
Regarding the competition enhancing effects of interregional electricity ex-
change, it can be concluded that market power analyses at least for Germany
should take this aspect into account. Within the analysis presented here, net-
work enlargements were determined exogenously, i. e. no explicit optima for
transmission investment were derived. Endogenous investment for network in-
frastructure requires a different type of model and therefore has not been the
focus of this analysis.
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Table 5. Installed generation capacities of strategic players and fringe in Germany and neighboring countries [MW]
Fuel type RWE E.ON Vattenfall EnBW Fringe FR BE/LU NL DK SW PL CZ AT CH
Hard coal 7249 9461 1729 3288 7161 7200 2502 4196 5722 879 20064 1652 1335 -
Soft coal 10554 1425 6932 453 718 - - - - 5 8269 7320 428 -
Gas 4297 3808 870 1083 8809 5898 6882 15440 2178 557 947 1808 3806 226
Oil 188 1779 1429 617 1375 8526 341 669 1313 3625 162 284 340 311
Nuclear 5499 8473 1421 4272 597 63200 5738 449 - 9050 - 3471 - 3230
Hydro
- RoR, Lake 741 1320 9 447 2390 20971 146 129 39 16024 629 1057 10054 12304
- Pumped 793 1110 2883 368 263 4302 2307 - - 427 1484 1145 1846 907
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